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two events as the dawn of a new era of international law, in which respect for human rights and the self-determination of peoples trumps the formal constraints of the protection of state sovereignty, Byers gives a totally different connotation to them: the Pinochet judgment, in Byers' opinion, was indeed a triumph of law over politics, but the Kosovo conflict, on the other hand, signifies the marginalization of international law in favour of a unilateral defence of political values. Whichever view one adopts, these events illustrate the dilemma faced by law between form and substance, community institutions and community values.
Three main themes stand out in the thoughtful and sometimes provocative articles included in this volume:
3 the relationship between international law and international relations theory, the impact of globalization on international law, and the role of the UN Security Council. All the contributions point out that international law cannot remain loftily above the fray of politics, but must resist the temptation to forego considerations of legitimacy for a simple observation of political events.
Political Science as a Threat to the Distinctive Character of International Law
To what extent can international law embrace international relations? In his essay on 'Carl Schmitt, Hans Morgenthau and the Image of Law in International Relations', Martti Koskenniemi traces the origins of international relations theory back to the Weimar experience of an ineffective, formalistic law which proved incapable of providing security and order. Emphasizing the differences between these two fields, Koskenniemi interprets recent calls for interdisciplinary cooperation between international lawyers and international relations theorists as a threat to the formal distinctiveness of international law. Just as Morgenthau's turn from international law to the 'real laws' of international relations, 4 with its emphasis on the power of the benign hegemony, resembles, in Koskenniemi's view, Carl Schmitt's reliance on the Reichspräsident (President of the Empire) 5 -and later the Führer Adolf Hitler 6 -as the authoritative protector of the law, one should not separate more recent calls for 'interdisciplinarity' of international law and international relations from its political implications, namely the defence of American hegemony. Within such a functionalist understanding, law amounts either to (instrumentalist) sociology or to (normative) Regardless of the question whether the rather unfavourable association of (neo)-liberalism with the deeply illiberal, so-called 'crown jurist of the Third Reich' is convincing, is this apparent return to a positivist orthodoxy 10 the end of the story of an interdisciplinary cooperation between international law and international relations? Friedrich Kratochwil's remarkable contribution to the present volume convincingly shows that it is not. In his article, entitled 'How Do Norms Matter?', Kratochwil analyses the role of norms in the theory and practice of international politics.
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Nevertheless, he clearly separates law as such from the political processes of decision-making. Instead of following the traditional theory of these two disciplines, which in a 'strange symbiosis of Realism and Legalism' juxtaposed legal hierarchy and power politics, he wants to redeem the role of practical criteria against any claim to fulfilment of the 'unrealizable logical ideal of uniqueness' (at 37). Argument over the alleged indeterminacy of law obscures the fact that norms, if not able to 'cause' outcomes, nevertheless provide 'reasons for action'. As Kratochwil observes, practical experience shows that the lack of a unique solution to legal problems does not justify the rejection of law altogether: 'the recognition of plural possibilities on the one hand, and the need to justify particular choices on the other, is the basis for "pluralism" and orderly change, which are the central goods a legal system is supposed to preserve' (at 45). In this perspective, law and politics constitute 'distinct styles within practical reasoning' (at 51). Invoking Wittgenstein, Kratochwil takes the intersubjective character of language -and therefore of norms -seriously. Norms and common understandings exclude idiosyncratic political choices and therefore represent 'some form of governance' (at 53). This understanding enables Kratochwil to criticize the treatment of norms as pure epiphenomena by political realism as well as the 'indiscriminate aggregation of values and norms' by (neo)-liberal theory. A pluralist understanding of the role of norms in politics allows both disciplines to continue as social practices, but renders futile the foundationalist hope of finding an 'absolute 12 Cf. MacCormick, 'Beyond the Sovereign State ', 56 Modern LR (1993) 12 Thus, the choice between facts and norms, legalism and realism, apology and utopia turns out to be a false one.
Economic Globalization in Search of Law
Debates on the impact of globalization on international law provide further illustration of this point. Is an international law based upon the 'sovereign equality' of states viable in a globalized world in which markets seem to escape the regulatory power of the state and in which non-governmental actors all too often set the political agenda?
13 Most of the contributors to the present volume detect fundamental changes in this regard, but reject claims of an outright decline of the state.
14 Christine Chinkin uses Richard Falk's image of the challenge to the state both by 'globalization from above' and 'globalization from below', that is by economic actors and the emerging 'international civil society'. 15 As an example of the influence of non-state actors, Chinkin analyses the impact of the women's movement on human rights and the inclusion of crimes against women in the statutes of international criminal tribunals. But she also diagnoses a 'fighting back' on the part of states. They still control both the law-making process and access to international fora. NGOs are appropriated by both states and economic players. She calls for a radical rethinking of the global social and economic agenda by confronting its gendered dimensions. In her view, this requires addressing the divisions and fissures within international civil society so that alternative voices to those of economic globalization may be heard.
Anne-Marie Slaughter analyses the role of more or less informal government networks in economic regulation.
16 She draws the conclusion that globalization leads to a power shift within, and a disaggregation of, the state rather than to its decline or disappearance. This also implies, however, changes in the nature of regulation, which becomes horizontal rather than vertical, informal rather than formal, persuasive rather than enforceable. She mentions two categories of government networks: so-called TROs, 'transgovernmental regulatory organizations', comprising members of domestic national or subnational agencies, and agreements between domestic regulatory agencies of two or more states. Both are said to be fast, flexible, cheap and, somewhat surprisingly, accountable. Being made up of competent national decision- Stern, 'How to Regulate Globalization', in Byers, supra note 1, at 247. makers, networks do not require formal adoption of their agreements by the state. In Slaughter's view, domestic accountability is to be preferred to the 'burgeoning supranational bureaucracy' of traditional intergovernmental organizations. The functional orientation and informal nature of these networks are said to enhance the participation of actors from different quarters, be they private or public, national or international.
For the first time, Slaughter tries to counter some of the criticisms voiced against her admittedly rosy picture of those networks. 17 In her opinion, networks are not the cause of the perceived decline in the provision of global public goods such as welfare and human rights. Using as an example the case of central banks, Slaughter considers independence from democratic domestic processes not as a vice, but as a virtue. Generally, the legitimacy of formal intergovernmental organizations or NGOs fares no better than that of informal networks. Cooperation of legislative networks might counter power shifts from legislative bodies to the government. Finally, the power of networks is soft, working more by persuasion than by binding agreements. But all of these responses hardly contribute to lessening the criticism. If networks are nothing more than the traditional back room for deal-making, one wonders what all the fuss is about. On the contrary, if their importance is growing, the question of accountability is not answered by reference to the 'softness' of their power. Describing these organizations as effective, secret and voluntary is not entirely benign. The secrecy of international dealings is not particularly helpful for public scrutiny. Voluntary membership does not compensate for a practice of exclusion. And at least in the Western liberal tradition, effective exercise of power requires democratic accountability. Nevertheless, Slaughter is correct when she argues that intergovernmental networks are an important area for both political and legal research. While political research might analyse the means and nature of their power, lawyers must ask whether and how they may acquire more accountability and legitimacy.
Perhaps, however, the argument for a fundamental change in world affairs through the processes of globalization of markets, technology and media proves too much. Some contributors are not at all certain that globalization does actually lead to a decline of the state or, at least, to a greater realization of non-state values. Edward Kwakwa, Assistant Legal Counsel of WIPO, emphasizes the importance of effective state systems, especially in the developing world. 18 In his view, globalization enhances rather than diminishes the role of the state. However, the separation between 'paradigm-setting' and 'paradigm-receiving' states challenges the legitimacy of international legal norms. Brigitte Stern also stresses the lasting role of states as the main actors in international relations in spite of economic globalization, though she does see their role as having been diminished. of economic efficiency over other values as well as of the uneven distribution of the gains produced by economic liberalization. In Stern's view, this situation demonstrates the complex relationship between law and politics: law is an element which may reinforce, ignore, or (attempt to) modify political reality. In order to counter instances of both economic and political unilateralism, for instance the Helms-Burton Act, she calls for a 'truly world-wide international law system of regulation' (at 255). For her, this requires not a weakening, but a strengthening, of the state as a mirror of identity, guardian of non-mercantile values, arbitrator between market and society, and organ of solidarity. In fact, however, very few international law measures have been put in place to 'regulate' globalization and the role of new actors at the international level. Nor, with the notable exception of the creation of the World Trade Organization, has existing law been significantly changed. In the absence of the creation of new norms, international law seems doomed to political irrelevance. The recent Seattle conference permits doubts about whether states are ready to meet that challenge.
The Security Council between Political Irrelevance and Legal Constraints
While economic globalization raises the question of the political impact of states, the debate over the Security Council shows that the relationship between international organizations and state sovereignty is as relevant as ever. But while the debate at the beginning of the 1990s centred on whether the exercise of the prerogatives of the Security Council would transform the Charter from a multilateral treaty to a true constitution of the international community -raising concerns about a lack of constitutional checks and balances 20 -the Kosovo conflict has demonstrated that the authority of the Council is once again more threatened by unilateralism than by an abuse of the prerogatives of the permanent members. Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, Legal Adviser of the French Foreign Ministry, presents the Security Council in its conventional role as creator of rights and obligations of member states, and as implementer and interpreter of the law, without attributing it legislative or judicial functions. '[T]hose acts which are frequently referred to as new forms of Security Council intervention turn out, in practice, to fit within the Council's traditional role. . .'
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At the other extreme, Vera Gowlland-Debbas emphasizes the 'extensive, discretionary powers' of the Council. Following Niklas Luhmann, she suggests combining the normative closure of the legal system with its cognitive openness to social developments. 22 Arguing that the legal system establishes its own 'legal reality', Gowlland-Debbas sees law exposed to the 'contradictory pulls' of centrifugal and globalizing forces, universality and compartmentalization. The establishment of an international 'ordre public' transforms international law from a mere 'society' to a 'community', a true social grouping with rights and obligations of its own, 23 embodied in such 'umbrella concepts' as jus cogens, obligations erga omnes and individual criminality. In that vein, Gowlland-Debbas argues for the use of Chapter VII by the Security Council as a legal sanction to violations of international law. Security Council resolutions are said to contain all the necessary elements for the attribution of responsibility: breach, imputability and legal sanctions. Their legal consequences consist in the nullity and non-recognition of situations brought about by the violation of international law. In Gowlland-Debbas' view, this demonstrates 'the way in which law operates in the selection and transformation of political decisions into legally significant elements ... which escape the ambit of political processes and in turn set new constraints on political action' (at 287). The prime example for such measures is, of course, Resolution 687 (1991) on legal sanctions against Iraq. 24 The attribution of individual criminal responsibility by the Council, either directly or through the creation of ad hoc tribunals, provides a further clear example. Such wide discretion of the Security Council naturally raises the question of its legal control. GowllandDebbas regards not only Charter Articles 24, 25 and 27 as such (formal and substantive) limits, but also all norms of jus cogens. Given the largely absent judicial control of the International Court of Justice, she considers the Security Council not as a quasi-judicial body, but rather as a political organ acting on behalf of the international community in support of an injured state. She thus aims for an institutionalization of the enforcement of fundamental community norms.
In the absence of a clear rule empowering the Security Council to enforce community norms beyond the maintenance of international peace and security, this approach does not resolve questions of legitimacy. Against such activism, Georg Nolte's warning, citing Castlereagh, of a new 'Holy Alliance' which 'was never intended as a Union for the government of the World, or for the Superintendence of the Internal Affairs of other States' 25 seems well in place. Nolte has 'no doubt that the
